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V 
THE NEW DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 
I .  THE DEMOCRATIC IDEA 
very skeptical thoughts were written over twenty S O M E  years ago by Miss M. P. Follett in her stimulating work 
on The N e w  State.’ Let us quote at  random a few phrases of 
her Introduction: 
6 6  6 Representative government,”’ she said, “party organi- 
zation, majority rule, with all their excrescences, are dead- 
wood. I n  their stead must appear the organization of non- 
partisan groups for the begetting, the bringing into being, 
of common ideas, a common purpose and a collective will.” 
What she points out as the political error of our age is 
that  “no government will be successful, no government will 
endure, which does not rest on the individual.” But she 
adds that “up t o  the present moment we have never seen 
the individual.” 
She points out it is not by sending more men t o  the ballot- 
box, nor sending them more often, that  direct government 
will find the individual. “Democracy,” she says, “is not a 
sum in addition. Democracy is not brute numbers; it is a 
genuine union of true individuals.” 
The question that  seems to  be the base of the whole prob- 
lem is sociological, for Miss Follett finds “the true man only 
through group organization. The  potentialities of the indi- 
’M. P .  Follett, The  N e w  State: Group Organization the Soluiion of Popular Govern- 
ment (New York: Longmans, Green, 1918). 
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vidual remain potentialities until they are released by group 
life. Man discovers his true nature, gains his true freedom 
only through the group. Group organization must be the 
new method of politics because the modes by which the in- 
dividual can be brought forth and made effective are the 
modes of practical politics.” 
What has often been overlooked is that  the man, when he 
votes, does not represent a particular, theoretical, or abstract 
self, but a whole complex of his life relations, activities, and 
interactions. He votes as the representative of a whole, of a 
complex social entity, of a group life. Let us therefore get at  
the group if we need the individual. 
I n  a couple or more sentences of the same author we de- 
tect her sociological argument : “Thus group organization 
releases us from the domination of mere numbers.” “The 
technique of democracy is group organization.” “The group 
organization movement means the substitution of intention 
for accident, of organized purpose for scattered desire.” 
Her criticism is that  “To-day the individual is submerged, 
smothered, choked by the crowd fallacy, the herd theory” 
and her advice is that  “The first reform needed in our po- 
litical practice is to find some method by which the govern- 
ment shall continuously represent the people.” 
Since I am no politician, I shall merely t ry  to  interpret 
the most recent features of our constitutional evolution in 
Brazil. If I have insisted on quoting Mary Follett’s Intro- 
duction, i t  is because the expressions she used seem t o  fit so 
well as explanations of our present situation. We have been 
struggling for a new democracy in Brazil, and the result 
has been a new state. What are the connections of this state 
with democracy-that is the point I wish to discusssuccinctly. 
A century ago, Sir George Cornewall Lewis, discussing the 
“Use and abuse of some political terms,” defined democracy 
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as a “government in which either a majority or a large por- 
tion of the people have, by means of the right of election, an 
influence on the appointment of members of the supreme 
power.” The fact that, for instance, the Athenian common- 
wealth had a strong percentage of slave population and that  
not one-tenth of its inhabitants partook of the supreme 
power, has never prevented political historians from con- 
sidering Athens as a “splendid achievement” in democracy. 
Nowadays, democracy is a multifarious form of society 
that  does not admit of universal application. Every nation, 
under some aspects a t  least, is democratic; even kings are 
described as democratic. 
There is, however, a tendency t o  make distinctions be- 
tween political democracy, social democracy, and economic 
democracy-forms which do not always coincide in the same 
state. It seems that, in the past, political democracy was 
unduly emphasized, the governing body being the only one 
taken into consideration. The conquest of political rights by 
the people has blurred the sharpness of its interest, whereas 
new forms of democracy are being aimed at  in social evolu- 
tion. Besides, pure democracy is no longer practicable, un- 
less the community is of small size and relatively undevel- 
oped; the only kind of democracy possible is an indirect or 
representative one, where people are present only by proxy, 
whether there are one or more degrees of election. But even 
a representative government might not be democratic; suf- 
frage is too much restricted. 
In  any event, one thing must be noted: the political-eco- 
nomic-social life of a big modern nation has developed in such 
a way that today the burdens of democracy are excessive 
and, as Professor James W. Garner puts it, “their tendency 
is t o  go to  extremes and to  devolve upon the electorate tasks 
which by reason of their character and multiplicity the peo- 
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ple are not competent to  discharge satisfactorily through 
direct action.” The  democratic control of foreign policy, for 
instance, might lead to  disastrous consequences. 
The real characteristic of contemporary democracy, result- 
ing from the wideness of its aims, political, economic, social, 
is the new spirit, the socialized aspect it has assumed in the 
twentieth century. 
In  two aspects,” says Walter E. Wey1,l “the democracy 
towards which we are striving differs from that  of today. 
Firstly, the democracy of tomorrow, being a real and not a 
merely formal democracy, does not content itself with the 
mere right to  vote, with political immunities, and generaliza- 
tions about the rights of man. Secondly, it is a plenary, 
socialized democracy, emphasizing social rather than merely 
individual aims and carrying over its ideals from the political 
into the industrial and social fields.” 
A Brazilian jurist, Dr. Francisco Campos, Minister of 
Justice and one of the authors of the present Constitution, 
has emphasized the contrast described in the above quotation 
from Walter Weyl’s book of 1912. To him, democracy has 
chiefly four meanings nowadays : it is first the suppression 
of privilege; it is also equal opportunity for every citizen; it 
is further the utilization of capacities; and lastly, it is the 
largest diffusion of material and moral goods. The essence of 
democracy is the organization of the state according to  the 
will of the people and the functioning of it with the coopera- 
tion, action, and frequent interference of that  same people. 
It is a widespread opinion in Brazil that  democracy is by 
no means a monopoly of the liberal state theory. In many 
cases, liberalism has distorted the democratic practice by 
allowing class struggle, party strife, personal ambitions and 
interests, excesses of individualism and even demagogy. It 
<(  
‘Walter E. Weyl, The New Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1912). 
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might not be irrelevant t o  explain the traditional restlessness 
of Latin American Republics by the use and abuse of liberal- 
ism in the interpretation of democracy in political life. 
We believe that very often democracy is not defined by 
its values and its aims, but rather, as Francisco Campos puts 
it, “by its ways, by the processes, by the machine, by the 
technique or by the different contrivances through which 
politicians forge public opinion or devise legal substitutes for 
the will of the people or the nation.” There is, of course, no 
relation between the democratic machine and the democratic 
ideal. The  more elaborate the mechanism, the more difficult 
it is for the people at  large t o  understand its working, and 
the greater are the opportunities for the professional political 
middleman to  interfere between the government and the 
people, t o  draw profits, advantages, and privileges tha t  
thwart the free play of real democracy. 
The equality of opportunity is reduced to  an equality of 
suffrage. When the vote has been cast as a formal manifes- 
tation of democracy, the substantive rights-to work, t o  
health, t o  security, t o  well-being-are baffled, for they are 
all supposed t o  be included in the ballot-box. “When the 
vote is cast,’’ says Campos, “relations between the citizen 
and the state are over.” 
There is no doubt that  democracy has been the aim of 
many political devices and that  many political mechanisms 
have been imagined and included in constitutional laws, 
such as universal suffrage, parliamentary systems, referen- 
dum, rotation in office, suffrage for women, recall, secret 
suffrage, and so on. Yet there is only one control for the 
whole machinery: it is “pressure from without”; it is public 
opinion and all the extra-constitutional devices of a truly 
political vitality. 
Brazil has been independent for over a century. We had 
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the Imperial Constitution and the Republican one. The first 
lasted sixty-five years, the second forty years. A new Re- 
publican constitution was passed in 1934, and was succeeded 
by the present Constitution of 1937. Let us examine briefly 
to  what extent these several constitutions were adequate to  
our needs, adapted t o  our customs and habits, in conformity 
with our spirit and our tradition, and the result of our ex- 
perience and practice in political life. Constitutions cannot 
be adapted from foreign patterns as ready-made clothes; 
they have to  be made t o  order t o  suit the customer and allow 
him to  keep a free and easy control of his usual movements. 
This seems evident, and theoretically it is; in practice, how- 
ever, we do not realize it so clearly, because of a very under- 
standable tendency to  generalization. Wearing collar and tie, 
buying the morning papers, and having afternoon tea, does 
not result in conformity of feelings and thoughts, in similarity 
of tastes and needs. Euro-American culture is multiform, 
according to  ethnic types, latitudes, and opportunities. 
11. C A U S E S  OF T H E  1937 M O V E M E N T  
In her very interesting work on Dom Pedro, the Magnani- 
mous,l Dr. Mary W. Williams of Goucher College has writ- 
ten some expressive words on our political life during the 
Empire. She entitles one of her chapters, “Dom Pedro’s 
Struggles with a Premature Political System.” The whole 
problem is thus stated in a nutshell. I could quote, of course, 
any number of Brazilian contributions on the subject, but 
this recent book by a prominent American historian of South 
America seems most suitable t o  my present purpose, pro- 
vided I am allowed to  quote freely, in order t o  give the true 
interpretation of her conception. 
‘Mary W. Williams, Dom Pedro the Magnanimous, Second Emperor of Brazil 
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1937). 
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(6 The  Emperor was, from the first, handicapped,” she says, 
“by a clash between the political facts of the country and its 
political ideas. Though the Brazilians who were interested 
in government wanted a democratic system, they lacked the 
experience and self-discipline needed t o  make such a system 
work.” In  fact Brazil was, at  the time, a very sparsely in- 
habited country, in which the population lived still in a semi- 
patriarchal way, in large tropical-agricultural estates, with 
slavery, general illiteracy, few social contacts, and many 
more shortcomings. 
Therefore Dr. Williams does in no way calumniate us 
when she writes: “But no one knew better than he (the 
Emperor) that  the Brazilian nation, largely illiterate and 
only recently permitted to  experiment with self-govern- 
ment a t  all, was quite unready for the democratic political 
system of Great Britain, where representative government 
existed for more than five centuries. But, in the interest of 
harmony, he tried t o  make the best of the existing situation.” 
Further, we read the following statement, backed by numer- 
ous Brazilian writers on political subjects: “During much of 
his reign, the Liberals and Conservatives had but a small 
membership and failed t o  stand consistently for clear-cut 
principles of government. They did not t o  any marked de- 
gree represent public opinion or currents of national thought.” 
“Thus the Emperor let unpreventable frauds bring about 
party changes. But for the sake of harmony he kept up the 
fiction that  the deputies represented the will of the nation.” 
As t o  what has been called in our history “dictatorship of 
morality,” she adds tha t  Dom Pedro exercised it benevolent- 
ly and permitted, as well, the pretense of a cabinet system. 
So the safety of the Empire was entrusted t o  the “Podir 
Moderadbr,” the moderating power of the Emperor. 
Although things did not stay perpetually in the same con- 
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ditions, but changed and evolved, that  was nevertheless our 
political experience of nearly seventy years of imperial re- 
gime. I admit what Herman G. James says,l “Democratiza- 
tion of the government would probably have spelled anarchy 
in Brazil as it did in all the Spanish American states after in- 
dependence. The half century of Dom Pedro’s reign afforded 
two generations of practice in politics and allowed a gradual 
and orderly transition from the monarchy to  the republic.” 
Now what was the experience of the other half century of 
republican regime? Influences of bookish culture had led 
our statesmen of the imperial era t o  ignore the people and 
the country in preparing a constitution modelled on Euro- 
pean ideas and practices. Those of the Republican period 
were not more original nor keener observers of the realities of 
our situation; they copied the United States instead of Eu- 
rope, and so was framed our first Republican Constitution of 
1891. “It was said,” wrote Madeiros e Albuquerque twenty- 
five years ago, “that the presidential regime that  had given 
to  the United States their magnificent prosperity would cer- 
tainly do the same for Brazil.” 
The  suddenness of the revolution, in 1889, had found the 
country unprepared for the new institution. Deprived of 
the imperial political elite, the republican statesmanship 
was unaware of the conditions and necessities of the people. 
There was no matured plan; there was plenty of utopian 
ideology but no organic idealism based on Brazilian realities. 
Besides, it was a decidedly critical moment in the nation’s 
economy, provoked by the agricultural crisis following the 
abolition of slavery. 
Soon did the founders of the new regime complain tha t  “it 
was not the Republic of their dreams.” 
‘Herman G. James, Brazil After a Ceittury of Independence (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., I p s ) ,  p. 143. 
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The deepest reason, however, of the unfitness of that  con- 
stitution was the lack of an organized public opinion. There 
was no “pressure from without,” no training in self-govern- 
ment, no class solidarity, no party interests of significance, 
no feeling of collective well-being to  be conquered and main- 
tained. “Conditions of vitality for such a regime,” said 
Oliveira Vianna, “could only be compared t o  those of a 
guinea pig under a vacuumized glass-bell.” 
It would be a natural question for us to  ask: how did such 
a political system work for exactly half a century? It  lasted 
because it was distorted, from the very beginning. Every 
one of our thirteen presidents had his own way of managing 
the situation; and the bomb exploded in the hands of the 
thirteenth president, just a couple of weeks before he was 
to  leave office, a t  the end of his legal term. 
The empire had been the period of pre-eminence of the 
( C  moderating power” of the monarch; the republic had 
shifted, theoretically at  least, pre-eminence to  the “legis- 
lative power.” All the democratic formulae were expressed : 
( r  sovereignty of the people,” “liberty,” “federation,” “uni- 
versa1 suffrage,” “division of powers,” and others. 
Such institutions, however, were precarious, for they had 
no strong public opinion to  back them. The formation of an 
effective public opinion in Brazil has been delayed by the 
geographical factors of distance and isolation, by the social 
factors of traditional paternalism of a patriarchal civiliza- 
tion, by psychological factors of indifference and apathy, 
by economic factors of helplessness and destitution in the 
hostile environment of a luxuriant nature. Invaluable racial 
qualities, both individual and social, have developed in 
Brazil; peaceful orderliness, kindheartedness, and discipline 
are perhaps Brazilian virtues, but aggressive vitality and 
spirit of cooperation have not yet reached their full develop- 
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ment. Culture, now spreading rapidly, was slow and un- 
assisted in the past. 
Under such circumstances, it is not difficult t o  realize 
what political parties could be. 
President Getulio Vargas said in his speech of November 
IO, 1937: “Our old parties, as well as our new ones in which 
the old had merged under new labels, had no ideological ex- 
pression; they stood under the shade of personal ambitions 
or local influences for the sake of groups merely interested in 
sharing spoils and in propitious combinations, with inferior 
objectives. The capacity of resistance of the regime disap- 
pears and the pacific contest of the ballot-box is transferred 
t o  the wild field of armed conflict. I n  some states, electoral 
preparations have been replaced by military preparations. 
The regional ‘caudilhismo,’ under the cover of party organi- 
zations, was arming in order t o  force upon the nation its deci- 
sions, thus positively threatening national unity.” 
The so-called parties, instead of being national expressions 
of broad, general classes of professional interests t o  inform 
and guide the executive, were always clusters of petty indi- 
vidual profiteers a t  the expense of the nation’s cause. They 
were clans, with bosses seeking advantages or protection. 
Only two or three times in our whole history did they happen 
t o  represent a truly collective interest-independence, abo- 
lition, and abdication. Otherwise they just worked for the 
“mediocritization,” if we may say so, of the governing elite, 
for the crowding of official positions, and for useless political 
agitation. The deputies in the federal parliament did not seat 
themselves according t o  party lines; they sat in bancadas, 
that  is t o  say, in groups by states under the leadership of the 
state deputy that represented the state political “situation,” 
as it was termed. The grouping had to  obey political instruc- 
tions and vote accordingly. The opposition of the state some- 
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times represented a minority. So the federal government 
could only work with the support of the state coalitions, 
giving cabinet posts t o  influential states and not t o  the ablest 
men, with very rare exceptions, as in the case of Rio Branco. 
Never was it possible t o  read a single party program, 
with principles, ideas, plans, or suggestions for political ac- 
tion, till in 1934, they cropped up by dozens, just because 
the second Republican Constitution recognized proportional 
representation, and the electoral code determined the mini- 
mal condition for parties t o  be officially recognized. It was a 
regular pulverization of public opinion. Of course, it was an 
artificial device t o  create parties where the natural conditions 
did not allow them t o  thrive on normal lines. 
No public opinion, no parties, no collective interests ade- 
quately represented, no landowners, no working class, no 
bourgeoisie, no industrial groups voicing their wants and 
aspirations; a whole nation standing aloof and leaving po- 
litical activity to  groups of professional politicians: that  was 
about the situation of the country half a century after the 
emperor had departed. 
How could a presidential regime work in such an atmos- 
phere of national indifference? The nation did not express 
wishes or needs, but just kept waiting-waiting every four 
years for a savior, a president-elect with a program of sal- 
vation. For three long years the poor man had t o  struggle, 
t o  compromise with the clans and the state oligarchies, in 
order t o  muddle through and reach the fourth year, in which 
political restlessness under the cover of electoral preparations 
was the activity of the readjusting group of petty interests. 
Happily, Brazil has been blessed with good presidents, hon- 
est men, patriotic and well-minded, who worked hard to  
save the country from the ills of an unsuitable constitution. 
Thus, for half a century, every one of our thirteen presi- 
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dents had t o  play the executive of a distorted constitution, 
according to  his temperament, in order t o  manage for the 
better an indifferent people to  whom government is the su- 
preme disposer and the most unavoidable curse. 
It would not be fair t o  say that the presidential regime 
adopted by our first Republican Constitution did not benefit 
the country in any way. The crisis of the revolution of 1889 
was threatening the very unity of the nation. The full powers 
which the Constitution of 1891 granted to  the president al- 
lowed Marechil Floriano Peixoto t o  consolidate the republic. 
Later, the same statute made it possible for our executive 
t o  develop an administrative activity of great efficiency and 
continuity. It allowed, for instance, President Prudente de 
Moraes t o  pacify the country; it helped Campos Salles t o  
restore the finances; it enabled Rodrigues Alves to  back the 
strong hand of Dr. Oswaldo Cruz in his sanitary campaign 
against yellow fever, t o  remodel and rebuild Rio de Janeiro 
under the Lord Mayor Pereira Passos, and t o  put into exe- 
cution the large international plans of the Chancellor liio 
Branco; it also permitted Affonso Penna to  pursue a con- 
sistent policy of economic development. In  fact, it is no ex- 
aggeration to say that the first twenty years of the Republic 
were prosperous, in spite of the regime that seemed t o  some 
extent responsible for such progress. 
Unfortunately the system was suited only in appearance 
to  real interests and national conditions. The maladjustment 
was due to  different causes: 
I .  It bred the regional spirit in semi-independent units 
of the country, in very dissimilar conditions of wealth and 
education. There was a growing tendency to  oppose the eco- 
nomic forces of more powerful states to the coordinating and 
unifying eft-orts of the Union. 
2. I t  gave the right t o  the states to constitute, under the 
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name of police force, real little armies with machine guns and 
field artillery, thus weakening considerably the budget for 
federal forces. 
3 ,  It duplicated the services of justice, weakening in the 
same way the federal organization. 
4. It yielded to  the individual states practically all sources 
of revenue, leaving to  the Union only customs duties and 
very few taxes. The constitutional impoverishment of the 
federal government hampered its action, when more and 
more responsibilities were accumulating in its own depart- 
ments. 
5 .  It permitted any number of restrictions on the internal 
market, determined by the economic privileges of local units. 
Interstate commerce was heavily handicapped; export taxes, 
import duties (these were unconstitutional, but charged all 
the same), and many more hindrances were commonly de- 
vised, sometimes with reactions on the international market. 
The real inadequacies of the regime appeared in 1910 when 
for the first time there was a contested election for the 
presidency. The military candidate, Marechi1 Hermes da  
Fonseca, was opposed by the civilian party headed by Ruy 
Barbosa. Had the constitution fitted Brazilian social con- 
ditions, it would have been a normal and peaceful contest. 
In  fact it showed a certain political vitality; currents were 
felt in public opinion; ideas and programs did not mean 
much, but there were some contrasts in attitude. Happily no 
revolution resulted from the victory of the military candi- 
date, but as a consequence of it, a new policy was inaugu- 
rated to  reduce or subdue the state oligarchies that were 
thriving unconstitutionally in different states, especially in 
the northern ones. 
Up  to 1910, one of its distortions that made the constitu- 
tion workable was the compromise of the Union with the 
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state family and relation groups or oligarchies that  held all 
offices and monopolized all privileges. It had been started by 
President Campos Salles under the name, “Policy of the 
Governors,” as the only way to  secure for the federal execu- 
tive the indispensable support of the states for his financial 
reconstruction scheme. These oligarchies, as extra-consti- 
tutional excrescences, were violently opposed and many of 
them had t o  give way. Unfortunately most oligarchies, dis- 
possessed in 1911-12, were changed for new ones no better 
qualified, sometimes worse, and with much less political 
training for the situation. 
The ruin of local oligarchies, under President Hermes da 
Fonseca, deprived many states of the one form of guidance 
and direction that expressed an organic reaction of unpre- 
pared social elements. 
Another extra-constitutional element was the extraordi- 
nary political force represented by the vice-president of the 
Senate, Pinheiro Machado, who headed a party of his own, 
called the P.R.C. (Conservative Republican Party), and 
acted as the grand elector of presidents and their adviser in 
political combinations. For nearly twenty years the myste- 
rious prestige of that  “lord protector” lasted, unexplained and 
autocratic, vitiating the fair play of the constitution through 
the hold he had on parliamentary and legislative activities. 
After 1912, hypertrophy attacked the executive, and a 
decidedly rapid decline became noticeable in Congress. As 
technical problems appeared more frequently, the Legis- 
lature avoided discussion of them and began to give whole- 
sale powers and authorizations, approving indiscriminately 
drafts and bills from the government. Congress showed thus 
a docility comparable only to  its revealed incapacity. Na- 
tional interests were yielded t o  clannish disputes and strug- 
gles for personal advantage. 
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After the Great War, a much stronger executive was found 
t o  be rooted in our presidential system. The election of the 
president became therefore a far more important event in the 
political life of the country; every three years a serious crisis 
was impending. The  permanent opposition of those who had 
no chance of controlling the governmental machine was 
transformed into a revolutionary attitude as there was no 
workable constitutional solution as an alternative. 
The first rebellious movements started in 1922, when the 
so-called “Republican Reaction” headed by ex-president 
Nilo Peqanha opposed the election of Arthur Bernardes. The 
episode had different revolutionary outbursts, yet i t  would 
be difficult t o  find an idea, a principle, or a program, for the 
most dissimilar elements joined in a rather confusing way t o  
antagonize the official course of action. It seems tha t  instinc- 
tively, without plan or preparation, the civic spirit of the 
people was seeking a form of expression in unconnected and 
unconscious convulsions. At t ha t  time some Marxist ide- 
ologies made their way among the leaders of the defeated 
movement, as they lived in the River Plate capitals, where 
they gathered as refugees. Later on, the fascist creed also 
converted some other discontented elements. The Bernardes 
presidency had to  be suspicious, autocratic, and repressive : 
i t  was a period of suspense; his successor was hailed as a 
savior. 
Unfortunately financial difficulties, the severe coffee crisis, 
the consequences of depression, questions related to  our 
industrial progress, and the adoption of foreign ideologies 
made the term of office of Dr. Washington Luis the very test 
of a liberal-democratic possibility among us. Opposition 
grew stronger, i t  had learned the lesson in revolution: it took 
on the character of an organic movement. As it was said, 
the revolution was “articulated” : instead of splitting public 
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opinion or the mass of the people, as in 1910 or 1922, the 
cleavage was between states: Minas Geraes and Rio Grande 
do Sul, aided by small Parahyba, which had grievances 
against the executive, headed the movement, and revolution 
broke out in October, 1930. 
If better organized than the previous ones, this revolution 
was not much richer in ideas and principles; but with the 
good will of some of the military leaders who interfered as 
conciliators, the struggle did not last more than three weeks 
and, for the first time in Brazil, a president was deposed. 
The ease with which the revolution was accomplished was 
a surprise t o  everybody, even to the revolutionists; it proved 
once more the inadequacy of the institution destroyed and 
the public indifference to  its overthrow. Nominally the vic- 
tory belonged t o  a party called the Liberal Alliance. The 
leaders were heading a very heterogeneous crowd. A social 
historian, Azevedo Amaral, called it a ‘‘mosaic of discontent- 
ments.” Of course, victory was to bring more confusion than 
clearness t o  political action : liberal-democrats, communists, 
Catholics, reactionaries, and militarists showed the most 
diverse and opposed tendencies and ideas, which they hoped 
to  see followed by what was expected to  be the “New 
Republic.” They had joined to  fight personalism and 
individual power, but in order to reorganize government 
they had to  concentrate power in the hands of a civilian 
dictator. 
It was no easy task for Dr. Getulio Vargas to  manage the 
political situation, avoiding clashes, holding enthusiasm 
within bounds, moderating reformers and, chiefly, forbidding 
reprisals and retaliation. We needed at  that  moment a man 
with great psychological capacity for objective analysis, un- 
willing to  display dramatic effects, cool-headed, and without 
animosity or vindictiveness. By chance it happened that such 
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a man was the appointed dictator for three and a half years. 
Between 1931 and 1934 Dr. Vargas had very few assist- 
ants; with tactful firmness he had t o  put aside many of his 
supporters and gradually eliminate the conspicuous revolu- 
tionary reputations of some who, without right t o  them, held 
positions of political responsibility. For over three years Dr. 
Vargas worked honestly t o  restore constitutional order in a 
new liberal-democratic regime. 
The most important episode of that  period was the Sao 
Paulo revolution of 1932 against the federal government. 
The  Sao Paulo leaders considered themselves victims of the 
1930 upheaval that  had deprived the Brazilian empire state 
of its political pre-eminence, as the economic leader of the 
country. It is difficult t o  say what were the plans of Sa0 
Paulo in I932 to  hasten the “constitutionalization” of the 
republic; in any event, they were defeated. Happily, Sao 
Paulo was in no way deprived of economic and social leader- 
ship. 
The Constituent Assembly was summoned in 1933, as 
expected, and for the first time in Brazil, it may be said 
positively, we had by universal suffrage and direct secret vote 
a free, absolutely free election of representatives without the 
slightest external pressure. The Brazilian people had spoken 
at  last! No end of hopeful speculation and expectation filled 
the hearts of the patriots, the well-minded citizens. Never 
had Brazil known such a true representation of the popular 
will, and discussion of the new constitution started under the 
most favorable circumstances of peace, security, and har- 
mony. 
In  July, 1934, the constitution was given to  the nation. 
It was of the liberal-democratic type. Every shade of po- 
litical ideology had had a chance t o  influence the new law of 
the country; the tragedy was that none of these ideologies 
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failed its opportunity. The Constitution of 1934 was a regu- 
lar gerrymander; it “started,” says Azevedo Amaral, “con- 
cerning itself with theology and ended its long-winded chain 
of articles by prescribing orthographic and spelling rules.” 
The dictator was elected constitutional president, and for 
three more years he tried earnestly t o  work under that  newly 
adopted system of liberal-democracy. 
111. T H E  CONSTITUTION OF 1937 
When the Constituent Assembly had framed the organic 
law of the country, and turned out t o  be its first Legislative 
Congress, the most genuine of all political bodies we ever had, 
the antagonism of opposite creeds appeared even more dis- 
tinctly. “It surpassed,” said Azevedo Amaral, “all the pre- 
ceding assemblies as a demonstration of lamentable inca- 
pacity in performing its legislative function.” 
During solid years of almost uninterrupted session, the 
Congress of 1934 did not pass a single complementary law 
scheduled in the constitution. The deputies, nevertheless, 
did not hesitate t o  approve matters of personal interest, 
many of which had t o  be vetoed by the executive. The  
budget was never voted within the legal term and in such 
conditions the executive could not balance the revenue with 
the appropriations. 
Grave dangers t o  national life did not find in parliament 
the needed reaction, nor in the constitution the means t o  
cope with them. In  fact, Communism, on one side, and 
Fascism, on the other, threatened Brazil, practically at  the 
same time, with new revolutionary agitation. In  haste some 
drastic emergency measures had to  be taken that  altered 
substantially the constitutional law, in order t o  grant t o  the 
executive the indispensable powers t o  restore peace and 
security. 
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I do not know to  what extent the extremist plans of 1935 
endangered the regime, but it is a fact that  the emergency 
powers voted by Congress marked the bankruptcy of our 
second republic, which, by the way, was very similar t o  the 
first. 
The  decisive reason for the coup d’ktat of November IO, 
1937, and the constitution of the new state is given by the 
President himself in the following words : “The destitution 
and disorganization of our political life, as it has been going 
on up t o  the present, is now proved by the way the problem 
of presidential succession is being handled among us: a 
ridiculous competition of groups, acting by graft and dema- 
gogic pledges in presence of the most absolute lack of interest 
and indifference shown by the vital forces of the nation. 
Heads of state governments, bossing agitators, rascals, and 
opportunists, against popular will, have transformed them- 
selves, from one day to  another, into political leaders war- 
ranting presidential candidates for election, just as if the life 
of the country, in its collective meaning, were mere conven- 
tion in order t o  legitimatize ambitions of provincial caudil- 
hismo.” In  consequence, the elected president of 1934 sprang 
the coup d’e‘tat, which was carried out peaceably on Novem- 
ber IO, 1937. 
The legislative power in the Constitution of 1937 is exer- 
cised by the National Parliament with the collaboration of 
the Council of National Economy and the President of the 
Republic (Art. 38). The Parliament is formed of two houses: 
the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Council, which has 
been substituted for the senate of previous constitutions. 
The Chamber of Deputies is formed by representatives of 
the people elected by indirect suffrage. Direct election is 
restricted t o  municipal assemblies, and the municipal alder- 
men of these assemblies, as well as ten more citizens elected 
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in the same direct way at  the same time, constitute a sort of 
electoral college that  elects the deputies to  the Federal 
Chamber. 
The  Federal Council is formed by state representatives, 
chosen by the state legislatures-one from each state. Ten 
more members of the Federal Council are to  be appointed by 
the president. The term of office for a councillor is six years 
and a deputy four years. 
The  other organ is the Council of National Economy, one 
of the innovations of the new law. It is t o  be composed of 
representatives from the different lines of business, selected 
for their special qualifications from professional associations 
and syndicates. They represent equally employers and em- 
ployees. The  Council has five sections : industry, agriculture, 
commerce, transportation, and credit. Here also is the presi- 
dent entitled to  appoint three representatives in each section. 
The Council is authorized to  contract specialists and experts 
and has a rather large field of action. I ts  power is expected 
to  be still further increased by law, as a function of the 
corporative state, yet it is exercised by “means of opinions 
and recommendations concerning subjects within its con- 
sultative province” (Art. 38). 
In principle, the initiative in law-making belongs t o  the 
government, yet from the Chamber or from the Federal 
Council initiative is legal if the  bill is supported by one-third 
of the house. 
As t o  the budget, every department prepares its appro- 
priations, but the final expenditure is planned by a special 
administrative department that  works as adviser to  the 
president, controlling and supervising the whole public serv- 
ice. Before the signature of the president, the budget is 
passed through the Houses of Parliament, with short delays 
to  discuss, approve, amend, or reject. 
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The President of the Republic coordinates the activity of 
the representative organs, controls the internal and external 
policy, promotes legislation and directs it, and superintends 
the administration of the country. He is in office for six 
years and is allowed to  nominate one of the candidates t o  his 
succession. An electoral college of I 25 voters (municipali- 
ties, Chamber, Federal Council, and National Council) is t o  
choose the name of the next president; in case of disagree- 
ment with the president, the candidate is elected by universal 
suffrage: the people are to  say which of two names must take 
office. 
Decidedly, after the teachings of past experience and to  
avoid censure of political privileges, so common among us, 
many powers have been concentrated in the hands of the 
executive. “The intention of our forefathers thirty years 
ago,” said Professor J. W. Jenks,’ “was to  give us a govern- 
ment of checks and balances, with executive, legislative, and 
judicial departments, distinct and separate; but, in order that  
our government may be efficient, the system of checks and 
balances which weaken it must be overcome by some co- 
ordinating force. In  our country tha t  force is our political 
parties.” In Brazil, as we have tried for a whole century to  
create political parties and have been unsuccessful, the co- 
ordinating force has been entrusted to  the president. 
The Brazilian constitution is not yet in full execution, for 
we are still in the preparatory period of organization. Many 
new organs are already in function, chiefly the technical 
councils for public administration, for commerce, for immi- 
gration, for public education, as well as technical institutes 
for coffee, for sugar, for cocoa, and other national economic 
interests. The preparatory stage will end with a plebiscite 
1J. W. Jenks, Principles of Politics from the Viewpoiiit of the American Citizen 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1909). 
310 Lectures on Brazilian Affairs 
for adoption or rejection of the constitution. But before 
election for the National Parliament, the National Economic 
Council must be organized. 
Whether this constitution fits our purposes or not, it is 
early t o  say, but never has a Brazilian statute law been so 
elaborated in social and economic matters, never have politi- 
cal pitfalls of our past been so earnestly avoided; it claims t o  
conform to Brazilian realities. The nomination of the presi- 
dent’s successor by the president in office was, in the past, 
one of the Brazilian unconstitutional realities. Why not have 
it in the constitution and legalize it, leaving t o  the nation a 
decision if the National Assembly disagrees with the presi- 
dent ? 
The election to  the senate, called today National Council, 
was a fraud, for the man “elected” was in fact chosen by the 
state assembly or the president of the state. Why not recog- 
nize him at once as the state representative and have that 
old practice transformed into a constitutional one ? 
The pressure of economic interests on legislative bodies 
was a curse in the past. Why not shift it t o  a professional 
body with only consultative power, as the Council of Na- 
tional Economy? 
Those and many more peculiarities of Brazilian political 
practice have been studied, and instead of being vigorously 
opposed have been included in the constitution, making 
legal what was, in the past, a distortion. What is, after all, 
the law but a crystallization of habits and customs? 
I n  fact it is, in the authoritative type of state, a really 
democratic move, for i t  introduces for the first time the vital 
popular forces into the structure of the state. Although it 
has nothing of Fascist or Nazi regime, it is an attempt to  
build a political entity along corporative lines. There is no 
more room left for professional politicians; the people are 
The New Democracy in Brazil 311 
directly or indirectly represented in all councils. Since I930 
not less than 2,500 syndicates have been officially recognized. 
On the other hand, the regime of 1937 has checked the 
spirit of reformation that  was threatening national unity. It 
has also stopped the spirit of internationalism that was 
growing under the form of European ideologies. There are 
isolated Fascist and Communist activities but, as A. A. 
Berle’ says in the Yule Review: 
The  bulk of South America, like ourselves, appears to  wish to  be in the 
orbit neither of fascism nor of communism; t o  wish t o  preserve for its 
citizens, as well as it can, freedom to  choose their own “good life.” These 
countries have not yet  evolved the economic method by which this can 
best be obtained, any more than we have; but they propose to evolve it 
as best they can, and are actively engaged in endeavoring to  work out  the 
mechanism. Government resting on a base other than the ballot box is 
no novelty in South America. Neither communism nor fascism was needed 
to  create this phenomenon; and the continued existence in various coun- 
tries of governments which claim sanction from something other than a 
majority vote of all individuals of full age is hardly a basis for classifying 
great parts of the continent as having taken sides in the  struggle between 
international ideologies. 
This may be applied equally to  Brazil. It is almost guess- 
work t o  say what will be our situation a few years hence. 
Anyway, something had to be done; ready-made constitu- 
tions of foreign pattern had apparently not suited our needs. 
This one has features that  might amaze the foreigner who 
still holds traditional prejudices in politics. Let him study, 
however, our problems, our situation, our democracy, and he 
will probably understand and say, “Well, that  is a truly 
Brazilian constitution.” 
*A. A. Berle, Jr., “After Lima,” Yde Rcvitw, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, March, 1939, 
PP. 454-5. 
